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A leading commentator recently estimated that
in the past twenty years "lawyers and judges have
spilled more words over the Fourth Amendment
than all of the rest of the Bill of Rights taken
together."' This outpouring of attention to the law
of searches and seizures can be attributed to the
application of the exclusionary rule to the states,2
which in turn necessitated a renewed attempt,
"inescapably judgmental" in its nature, to give
"concrete and contemporary meaning to [a] ...
brief, vague, general, unilluminating [fourth
amendment] text"0 aimed at protecting the people
from "unreasonable searches and seizures" by gov-
ernmental officials.4 Given the amendment's open
texture as well the often passionate clashes of civil
liberties and law enforcement values raised by
many of its cases, it is not surprising that courts
and commentators have encountered "inherent dif-
ficulties in developing a sound body of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence."
5
Doctrinal disarray under the fourth amendment
is vividly evidenced in the area of consent searches.
While it is generally, but not always, agreed that
voluntary consent by criminal suspects, and under
certain conditions by third parties, to informa-
tional gathering intrusions by the government
eliminates the necessity of supporting the intrusion
with probable cause or a search warrant,6 it is less
* Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of
Law.
1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT V (1978).
2 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3 Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REV. 349, 353-54 (1974).
4The full text of the fourth amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
5 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 1.
6 Not all cases exempt situations of voluntary consent
to governmental intrusions from the warrant require-
clear why consent has this effect. As one scholar
notes, "[t]he theory underlying the consent-search
... is unclear." 7 Some theorists take consent cases
as instances ofjustified or excused warrantless gov-
ernmental intrusions which nevertheless remain
subject to the fourth amendment's standard of
reasonableness! On this view, consent cases are
viewed as permissible fourth amendment searches.
More commonly, however, consent situations are
seen as inherently reasonable non-searches, alto-
ment. See, e.g., Graves v. Beto, 424 F.2d 524 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 960 (1970), where the court held
inadmissible for lack of a warrant a sample of defendant's
blood extraction of which he had voluntarily consented
to provide in response to a police request. In making their
request, the police had misrepresented their purpose in
seeking the sample, leading defendant to believe it was
sought to determine alcoholic content while in fact it was
sought to implicate defendant in a rape.
The vast majority of cases, however, hold the warrant
requirement inapposite in consent contexts. See, e.g.,
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974); Schneck-
loth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
7 Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 358. In the area of third-
party consent "the United States Supreme Court has had
remarkably little to say on the subject. In the relatively
few third-party consent cases which have reached the
Court, the theoretical underpinnings of such consent
have not been the subject of close or detailed analysis."
2 W. LAFAvE, iupra note 1, at 692.
8 Professor Saltzburg finds the basis for such a view in
the majority opinion in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218:
[Tlhere remains a very straight-forward, powerful
argument in support of the majority's result. That
argument can be summarized as follows: The
Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable
searches; prior decisions indicate that where the
government wants to use power to force a search
and seizure, the warrant clause is the basic defini-
tion of reasonableness; but where the government,
rather than using coercive power to force and seize,
asks people for their permission to conduct a search,
the warrant clause is inapplicable; and, where the
warrant clause is inapplicable, the basic test is
reasonableness under the circumstances.
S. SALTZBURC, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES
AND COMMENTARY 281 (1980). Similarly, Professor Yackle
states: "[S]ome authorities view consent as merely an-
other exception to the warrant requirement." Yackle, The
Burger Court and the Fourth Amendment, 26 KAN. L. REV.
335, 355 n.149 (1978).
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gether removed from fourth amendment purview.
9
Strictly speaking ... [the categories of voluntarily
inviting the state's entry or of severing all interest in
the thing taken] are not 'exceptions' to the warrant
rule. They are not allowable breaches of security,
justified by some recognized form of exigency. These
events are not breaches at all; the state does not
invade secure places by consensual entry.'0
These different conceptions of the role of consent
searches in fourth amendment jurisprudence can
be accounted for in large measure by the difficulty
in defining the proper relationship of consent doc-
trine to the "expectation of privacy" rubric which
has emerged as the test for determining the scope
of the fourth amendment. Unlike most other ex-
ceptions to the warrant rule, 1 consent situations
apparently manifest the absence of expectations of
privacy and thus arguably remove the cases from
fourth amendment purview altogether. This con-
sequence, while generally unproblematical, can re-
sult in the restriction of sound doctrinal develop-
ment.
This article examines and criticizes the prevalent
theory of consent searches as invariably outside the
scope of the fourth amendment. It will illustrate
that the theory inadequately governs certain types
of cases which evidence unreasonable governmen-
tal conduct notwithstanding the voluntary consent
of the person searched and the absence of expec-
tations of privacy. Clarifying the appropriate
fourth amendment role of consent is important for
its own theoretical sake and because consent is
frequently used to support government intrusion
into the private lives of citizens)
2
GENERAL FOURTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
The fourth amendment, made applicable to the
states through the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment,1 3 has proven notoriously diffi-
cult to interpret. Twenty years ago Justice Frank-
furter stated, "The course of true law pertaining to
searches and seizures ... has not... run smooth."' 4
The present road is not without its doctrinal
9 See generally Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amend-
ment, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 47 (1974).
10 H. UVILLER, CRIMINAL JusTIcE: INVESTIGATION AND
ADJUDICATION 218 (2d ed. 1979).
" See notes 69-86 & accompanying text infra, for a
discussion of exceptions to the warrant rule.
"2 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 1, at 612.
'5 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
bumps.'" The lack of clarity and consistency in
fourth amendment decisions largely results from a
judicial failure to articulate the amendment's un-
derlying principles.' 6 Particularly important is the
uncertainty about whether the proscription against
unreasonable searches and seizures must be viewed
from the perspective of individual citizens, with
emphasis on vindicating the personal rights of the
parties in particular cases, or whether the thrust of
the amendment is more appropriately directed to-
ward general regulation of government in fourth
amendment contexts.,1 7 The former "atomistic"
view'8 of the amendment focuses on the interests of
those searched with little regard for the perspective
of the searcher 19 while the latter "regulatory"
view20 pays particular attention to the state of
mind of the searcher with less attention to the
concerns of those searched.2 ' While these two views
may be complementary and need not be mutually
exclusive,22 the recent judicial trend appears to be
in the direction of emphasizing the atomistic and
minimizing the regulatory view2a despite the fact
that the primary remedy for fourth amendment
violation, exclusion of the fruits of illegal searches
and seizures from admission into evidence against
those whose rights have been violated,2 is largely
premised on a theory of regulating future govern-
mental behavior.s The emphasis on the atomistic
'5 For example, in agreeing with Professor Amsterdam
that Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), marks
a "watershed of fourth amendment jurisprudence," Pro-
fessor LaFave suggests that "it can hardly be said that
the Court produced clarity where theretofore there had
been uncertainty. If anything, the exact opposite has
occurred." I W. LAFAvE, supra note 1, at 228.
16 See Bacigal, Some Observations and Proposals on the Nature
of the Fourth Amendment, 46 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 529
(1978).
17 Others have also focused on this uncertainty in
discussing consent searches. See generally id.
'8 See Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 367.
'9 Bacigal, supra note 16, at 530.
20 Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 367.
2' Bacigal, supra note 16, at 530.
22 See generally id.
23 Id. at 530-3 1. See also notes 29-59 & accompanying
text infra.
' See generally Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAvE, & J. ISRAEL,
MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 184-91 (4th ed. 1974);
Sunderland, Liberals, Conservatives, and the Exclusionary Rule,
71J. CRIM. L. & C. 343 (1980).
2 [Tlhe Exclusionary Rule has rested on the deter-
rent rationale-the hope that law enforcement of-
ficials would be deterred from unlawful searches
and seizures if the illegally seized, albeit trustwor-
thy, evidence was suppressed often enough and the
courts persistently enough deprived them of any
[Vol. 71
CONSENT AS A BAR TO FOURTH AMENDMENT SCOPE
view, while perhaps generally sound,2 6 has, as will
be shown, unfortunate theoretical implications for
consent searches.
Intrusions by law enforcement agents are not
required by the amendment to be reasonable unless
they are either searches or seizures that bear the
requisite relationship to people and their security
in their "persons, houses, papers, and effects.",
27
benefits they might have gained from their illegal
conduct.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388,
415 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Sometimes courts refer to the interest in maintaining
judicial integrity as a basis for excluding illegally seized
evidence. "Courts which sit under our Constitution can-
not and will not be made party to lawless invasions of
the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhin-
dered governmental use of the fruits of such invasions."
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968). See also Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960). But the courts
seem uncommitted to the judicial integrity basis for
excluding fruits of illegal searches and seizures since they
permit convictions of defendants seized in violation of
the fourth amendment to be upheld. See, e.g., Frisbie v.
Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952). Clearly the deterrence
rationale best explains the purpose of the exclusionary
rule. See Oaks, Studying the Excusionag Rule in Search and
Seizure, 37 U. Cr. L. REv. 665, 666-72 (1970). But see
Sunderland, supra note 24, at 348-51, 359-60.
2 Thoroughgoing application of the regulatory view,
with its emphasis on deterring future governmental vi-
olations of the fourth amendment, may result in exclusion
of illegally obtained evidence only when it is seized in
bad faith.
If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter
unlawful police conduct then evidence obtained
from a search should be suppressed only if it can be
said that the law enforcement officer had knowl-
edge, or may properly be charged with knowledge,
that the search was unconstitutional under the
Fourth Amendment.
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975). In
objecting to this view, Justice Brennan said:
The new formulation obviously removes the very
foundation of the exclusionary rule as it has been
expressed in countless decisions. Until now the rule
in federal criminal cases decided on direct review
has been that suppression is necessarily the sanction
to be applied when it is determined that the evi-
dence was in fact illegally acquired. The revision
unveiled today suggests that instead of that single
inquiry, district judges may also have to probe the
subjective knowledge of the official who orders the
search, and the inferences from existing law that
official should have drawn. The decision whether or
not to order suppression would then turn upon
whether, based on that expanded inquiry, suppres-
sion would comport with either the deterrence ra-
tionale of the exclusionary rule or "the imperative
ofjudicial integrity."
Id. at 552-53 (footnotes omitted).
27 Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 356. "Since we held that
Protection of personal privacy, while not specifi-
cally mentioned in its text, has emerged as the
central value underlying the fourth amendment.28
Not surprisingly, the definition of fourth amend-
ment searches and seizures has thus been linked to
invasions of personal privacy.
EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY
In Katz v. United Statess the United States Su-
preme Court laid the foundation for defining the
scope of the fourth amendment's protection of
privacy. In rejecting earlier cases which had limited
fourth amendment applicability to physical intru-
sions into protected areas like the home,30 the Court
held that any governmental intrusion which vio-
lates a person's justifiable reliance on privacyI
could trigger the amendment: "The ... Amend-
ment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amend-
ment protection.... But what he seeks to preserve
as private, even in an area accessible to the public,
may be constitutionally protected."'s 2 Thus, the
Court held that government interception of tele-
phone conversations by placing an electronic mon-
itoring device on a public telephone booth consti-
tuted a fourth amendment search and seizure.3
Having concluded that the scope of the amend-
ment extended to the case, the Court found the
search and seizure "unreasonable" since it lacked
a supporting warrant.Y Justice Harlan, in a con-
the location of the evidence in question was not within
the protection of the Fourth Amendment, the reason-
ableness of the search is not a relevant constitutional
consideration." Marullo v. United States, 330 F.2d 609
(5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 850 (1964).
To determine whether a police intrusion constitutes a
fourth amendment search is sometimes extremely diffi-
cult. See Gardner, Sniffing for Drugs in the Classroom-,
Perspectives on Fourth Amendment Scope, 74 Nw. U.L. REV.
803, 831 (1980). Much of this summary of general fourth
amendment doctrine draws on this article.
28 "[F]ourth amendment litigation ... has centered on
the privacy issue." Bacigal, supra note 16, at 534.
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
30 Earlier cases had held that a physical trespass into
a protected zone of privacy for the purpose of gathering
material evidence was necessary to constitute a search
and seizure. Thus, the fourth amendment was held in-
applicable where federal officials intercepted conversa-
tions (no seizure of material things) through surreptitious
wiretap (no search because no physical trespass). Olin-
stead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464-66 (1928).
3' 389 U.S. at 353.
2Id. at 351-52.
3 Id. at 355.
" Id. at 354-59.
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curring opinion, elaborated on the scope of the
privacy interest protected by the fourth amend-
ment: "IT]here is a twofold requirement, first that
a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) ex-
pectation of privacy and, second, that the expec-
tation be one that society is prepared to recognize
as 'reasonable. ' '-3 5 Although Justice Harlan later
had second thoughts about this conception,3 6 it has
become the primary judicial standard for defining
fourth amendment searches.3
The relevance of a subjective expectation of
privacy as a necessary condition for the invalida-
tion of a search under the fourth amendment is
questionable. It raises the specter of governmental
circumvention of the fourth amendment in future
Katz-like cases by simply notifying the public that
monitoring devices would be regularly installed on
telephone booths, thus defeating the expectations
of privacy one may previously have had in phone
booths.38 For this reason, a variety of commentators
have urged abandonment of the subjective expec-
tation formulation,3 9 and the Supreme Court has
recently cautioned that in some situations it "pro-
vide[s] an inadequate index of Fourth Amendment
protection. ' 4 Nevertheless, a majority of the Court
-1 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
-1 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 1, at 230. Amsterdam, supra
note 3, at 384; See text accompanying notes 43-45 infra.
37 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 1, at 230 (1978 & 1980
Supp.); Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 384. See also Smith
v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
38 See Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 384.
g See id. See also 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 1, at 230;
Bacigal, supra note 16, at 535-37.
4 Situations can be imagined, of course, in which
Katz' two-pronged inquiry would provide an inad-
equate index of Fourth Amendment protection. For
example, if the Government were suddenly to an-
nounce on nationwide television that all homes
henceforth would be subject to warrantless entry,
individuals thereafter might not in fact entertain
any actual expectation of privacy regarding their
homes, papers, and effects. Similarly, if a refugee
from a totalitarian country, unaware of this Nation's
traditions, erroneously assumed that police were
continuously monitoring his telephone conversa-
tions, a subjective expectation of privacy regarding
the contents of his calls might be lacking as well. In
such circumstances, where an individual's subjective
expectations had been 'conditioned' by influences
alien to well-recognized Fourth Amendment free-
doms, those subjective expectations obviously could
play no meaningful role in ascertaining what the
scope of Fourth Amendment protection was. In
determining whether a 'legitimate expectation of
privacy' existed in such cases, a normative inquiry
would be proper.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. at 740-41 n.5.
continues to utilize the subjective expectation for-
mulation.41
The second of Justice Harlan's requirements,
that the privacy expectation be recognized by so-
ciety as reasonable, has also proven problematical.
This supposedly objective test conceals a serious
ambiguity. Whether the test is meant to be nor-
mative, one that defines justifiable expectations
citizens have a right to assert against the govern-
ment, or simply descriptive of those expectations
reasonable people in fact possess, is not clear. Sev-
eral post-Katz cases have resolved the ambiguity in
favor of the descriptive interpretation by focusing
on such considerations as whether reasonable peo-
ple would have assumed risks of privacy violations
in given situations or would have protected privacy
by taking reasonable precautions.
4 2
No doubt realizing the inadequacy of his Katz
formula, Justice Harlan offered a different concep-
tion in United States v. White,43 in which he dissented
from the plurality's holding that surveillance of the
defendant's conversations by use of a monitoring
device planted on a governmental informer who
engaged the defendant in conversation did not
constitute a search since the defendant assumed
41 Id. at 740. Some commentators apparently favor the
subjective expectation consideration.
[T]he implication of Katz ... is that the will of
the actual victim of the search is the matter of
primary concern.... [T]he Court has defined cer-
tain risks which one must assume, regardless of
intent, in conveying things or words to others. To
have so quickly ended the effort begun in Katz to
let citizens define for themselves a zone of privacy
is regrettable.
Tigar, Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel,
84 HARV. L. Rev. 1, 14 (1970).
12 On this view, one who fails to take sufficient precau-
tions has assumed the risk that the government will
intrude upon his activities. Thus, failure to pull one's
curtains precludes reasonably expected privacy in a room
observed by FBI agents through binoculars from a van-
tage point thirty-five feet away. Commonwealth v. Hern-
ley, 216 Pa. Super. Ct. 177, 263 A.2d 904 (1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 914 (1971). Under this theory, the de-
fendant's expectation of privacy in Katz was reasonable
not because people have rights to be free from govern-
ment monitoring of their conversations, but because the
defendant could have done nothing to protect himself
from being monitored. See also Jacobs v. Superior Court,
36 Cal. App. 3d 489, 111 Cal. Rptr. 449 (1973) (police
officer violated defendant's expectation of privacy by
peering through a small crack in blinds after defendant
had exhibited privacy expectations by closing the window
and drawing the blinds); Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz
Expectation of Privacy Test, 76 MICH. L. Rev. 154, 168
(1977).
13 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
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the risk that his confidant might be untrustwor-
thy. 4 Apparently disavowing the descriptive focus
on privacy expectations spawned by his Katz con-
currence and opting instead for a normative stan-
dard defining rights of privacy regardless of factual
reliances, Justice Harlan said:
The analysis must, in my view, transcend the search
for subjective expectations or legal attribution of
assumptions of risk. Our expectations, and the risks
we assume, are in large part reflections of laws that
translate into rules the custom and values of the past
and present.
Since it is the task of the law to form and project,
as well as mirror and reflect, we should not, as
judges, merely recite the expectations and risks with-
out examining the desirability of saddling them
upon society. The critical question, therefore, is
whether under our system of government, as re-
flected in the Constitution, we should impose on our
citizens the risks of the electronic listener or observer
without at least the protection of a warrant require-
ment.
This question must ... be answered by assessing
the nature of a particular practice and the likely
extent of its impact on the individual's sense of
security balanced against the utility of the conduct
as a technique of law enforcement.4
Thus, to Justice Harlan and a number of others,
the definition of fourth amendment searches and
seizures requires a value judgment about what
sense of security is worth constitutional protection
and whether, and to what extent, it is threatened
by a particular police practice. 6 While Justice
Harlan's standard in White would balance the
utility of the police practice as a law enforcement
technique against the sense of security of the indi-
vidual in the particular case at hand, others have
opted for a broader formula in terms of "whether
permitting the police regularly to engage in that
type of practice, limited by nothing 'more than
self-restraint by law enforcement officials,' ... re-
quires the 'people' to which the Fourth Amend-
ment refers to give 'up too much freedom at the
cost of privacy."'
47
Such manifestations of the regulatory view may
of course be inconsistent with an atomistic view of
searches and seizures which requires a showing of
44Id. at 752.4 5 Id. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting).46 See, e.g., 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 1, at 231-33;
Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 403; Bacigal, supra note 16,
at 536.
47 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 1, at 233.
subjective privacy expectations by the person as-
serting the fourth amendment claim. There may
be cases where police violate the spirit of the fourth
amendment without offending anyone's actual pri-
vacy expectations.48 Fortunately, to restrict the def-
inition of searches and seizures to an atomistic
approach is not theoretically necessary. While the
Katz majority speaks in terms ofjustifiable reliances
on privacy, this need not entail a requirement of
actual reliance to trigger the fourth amendment.
Rather, the privacy reliance described may be
viewed as an interest citizens justifiably have rights
to possess regardless of actual circumstances. Jus-
tice Harlan's ultimate rejection of the subjective
expectation requirement reduces the force of his
Katz concurrence. Moreover, while a view of the
fourth amendment as protecting atomistic spheres
of privacy is certainly suggested in Katz, the Court
there also noted that the amendment's "protections
go further, and often have nothing to do with
privacy at all."49 What non-privacy protections the
'8 Professor Amsterdam puts such a case:
Suppose that two men drive into Minneapolis
and rent a hotel room, paying in advance for three
nights. During the first night, they plan a bank
robbery which they execute the next day. Following
the robbery, they drive directly out of town, never
returning to the hotel. Late that same evening,
policemen go the rounds of the local cheap hotels,
armed with a police artist's sketch of the unmasked
half of one bank robber's face drawn from a by-
stander's description. The night manager tells the
officers that the sketch looks like one of the guys in
room 212. From outside the hotel, the officers ob-
serve that the lights in 212 are lit. The night man-
ager informs them that the occupants checked in
yesterday afternoon for three days. After obtaining
the manager's permission, the officers break the
door of room 212 in force with drawn guns. No one
is there, of course; but the officers find and take
away a penciled map of the bank area, parts cut
from a stocking to make a stocking mask, and other
items that are later sought to be used in evidence to
connect the former occupants of the room with the
bank robbery after their apprehension.
On the defendants' motion to suppress this evi-
dence, the first question that the court will ask is
whether any violation of the fourth amendment
occurred. From the perspective of the occupants,
room 212 was 'abandoned' and they had no consti-
tutionally protected interest in it at the time of the
search. From the perspective of the police, however,
the room appeared to be occupied; they entered it
upon that assumption; and it is difficult to imagine
a more egregious case of the kind of police conduct
that the fourth amendment was designed to prevent.
Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 368 (footnotes omitted). See,
e.g., United States v. Payner, 100 S. Ct. 2439 (1980).
49 389 U.S. at 350.
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Court had in mind is not clear,6° but the general
interest in regulating government power seems a
plausible candidate.5 1 It should be emphasized,
however, that expansive "regulatory" definitions of
searches and seizures are at present largely the
recommendations of commentators. The courts
continue to apply an atomistic approach, focusing
on actual expectations of parties in particular cases
and the actual expectations of reasonable people,
without considering the desirability of such expec-
tations, whether citizens should be entitled to pri-
vacy rights not actually expected, or whether the
fourth amendment requires regulating governmen-
tal intrusions not offending actual or reasonable
privacy expectations.
STANDING
The "standing" requirement which restricts liti-
gation of fourth amendment claims to those parties
whose rights have been offended provides further
evidence of the judicial preference for the atomistic
mode of analysis. While the courts recognize the
regulation of governmental practices which
threaten fourth amendment interests as a relevant
consideration, "the need for deterrence and hence
the rationale for excluding the evidence [seized
through an illegal search] are strongest where the
Government's unlawful conduct would result in
imposition of a criminal sanction on the victim of
the search. 5 2 Fourth amendment rights are per-
-o In a footnote the Court describes "open" seizures of
property and public arrests of persons as supposedly
"nonprivate" fourth amendment matters. Id. at 350 n.4.
But if privacy is "the claim of individuals.., to determine
for themselves when, how, and to what extent informa-
tion about them is communicated to others," A. WESTIN,
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967), or "control over when
and by whom the various parts of us can be sensed by
others," Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RuT. L. REV.
275, 281 (1974), then it is difficult to categorize the open
seizure or public arrest cases noted by the Court as
nonprivate matters.
5i See Bacigal, supra note 16, at 555.
52 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
There may, of course be cases where the standing require-
ment may arguably inhibit the regulatory interest. See,
e.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969),
which denies standing to defendant C to assert fourth
amendment claims after the government illegally moni-
tored a telephone conversation between A and B which
implicated C in criminal activity. Arguably the police
are encouraged by such doctrine to purposely violate the
fourth amendment rights of people like A and B in order
to catch the C's of this world. For this reason, California
abolished standing in People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755,
290 P.2d 855 (1955), which holds that defendants in that
state have standing even if allegedly illegal searches and
seizures are directed at others.
sonal and can only be raised by those whose own
"reasonable expectation[s] of freedom from govern-
mental intrusion" have been violated.ss To possess
standing, the person seeking to challenge the legal-
ity of a search as a basis for suppressing evidence
must show that he himself had a legitimate expec-
tation of privacy in the area searched. 54
A recent Supreme Court decision, Rakas v. Illi-
nois,as illustrates the standing issue. The Court held
that passengers in a lawfully stopped car lacked
standing to object to warrantless rummaging by
the police under the seats and into the locked glove
compartment which revealed weapons and am-
munition implicating the passengers in a recent
robbery. Although the passengers were in the car
with the owner's permission, they did not assert
property or possessory interests in the automobile
or in the property seized. Relying on recent deci-
sions finding lesser expectations of privacy in cars
than in, inter alia, houses and apartments, the Court
found that lawful presence in the car was itself
insufficient basis for investing standing: "Passen-
ger[s] qua passenger[s] simply... [do] not normally
have a legitimate expectation of privacy" in the
areas under the seat and in the glove compart-
ment.6 Moreover, those particular passengers
failed to show any special privacy expectations in
those areas.
Rakas is significant for present purposes because
it merges the standing issue with the issue of fourth
amendment scope. In rejecting the claim that it
might serve some "useful analytical purpose to
consider ... [the principle that fourth amendment
rights are personal and not vicarious] a matter of
standing, distinct from the merits of a defendant's
Fourth Amendment claim," the Court concluded
that "the better analysis forthrightly focuses on the
extent of a particular defendant's rights under the
Fourth Amendment, rather than on any theoreti-,
cally separate, but invariably intertwined concept
of standing."
57
Rakas evidences the Court's continued commit-
ment to a narrow, highly atomistic application of
the Katz expectation of privacy rubric.sa There is
53 Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 367-68 (1968).
" United States v. Salvucci, 100 S. Ct. 2547, 2553
(1980). See Note, Fourth Amendment-The Court Further
Limits Standing, 71 J. CRiM. L. & C. 567 (1980).
55 439 U.S. 128 (1978). See Note, Fourth Amendment-
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in Automobile Searches, 70 J.
CRIM. L. & C. 498 (1979).
439 U.S. at 148-49.
57 Id. at 138-39.
5 The Court implicitly reaffirms its approval ofJustice
Harlan's Katz concurrence. See id. at 143-44 n.12.
[Vol. 71
CONSENT AS A BAR TO FOURTH AMENDMENT SCOPE
no mention in the majority opinion about whether
passengers ought to be entitled to privacy expec-
tations in the locked glove compartments of the
cars in which they are riding. The Court simply
concludes that, as a matter of fact, passengers do
not generally possess such expectations.
59
THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
Once the occurrence of a search or seizure has
been shown, its reasonableness must be considered.
As illustrated by the discussion of Katz, searches or
seizures of evidence conducted without warrants
are generally held to be unreasonable per se.' °
Search warrants are issued if a judge or magistrate
concludes on the basis of probative evidence6 ' that
probable cause, i.e., reasonable grounds to believe
a crime has occurred or is occurring,62 exists both
to link the items sought to criminal activity and to
indicate that the items will be found in the place
to be searched.6a
Several considerations justify the warrant re-
quirement. Since a neutral judge or magistrate
decides whether a search or seizure is justified, the
decision is theoretically more impartial than if
made by law enforcement officers.6 4 In addition,
since the warrant issues before the search and
seizure, there is some assurance that the informa-
0 The Court does leave open the possibility of a dif-
ferent result if the initial stop of the car had been illegal.
To utilize the terminology of Professor Weinreb, while
the Rakas passengers may not have had legitimate "pri-
vacy of place" expectations in the car, they no doubt had
legitimate "privacy of presence" expectations in being
secure in their persons from illegal governmental intru-
sions. See Weinreb, supra note 9, at 52-54. If the Rakas
defendants had challenged the initial stop, they likely
would have had standing since their personal freedom
was intruded upon by the stopping of the car. 3 W.
LAFAVE, supra note 1, at 59 (Supp. 1980).
60 See also United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7-
11, 15-16 (1977); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443, 454-55, 478-82 (1971) (plurality opinion); Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969).
61 See 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 1, at 465-76.
6 See'United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109
(1965).
63 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 1, at 441-43, 703-16.
Whether determined prior to or after a search or seizure,
probable cause may be established solely on the basis of
hearsay or through information provided by credible and
reliable informants. Id. at 469-70. See United States v.
Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971); Spinelli v. United States,
393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108
(1964).
" The police are often perceived as having interests in
conducting searches. The magistrate thus acts as a buffer
between the police officer, who is "engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime," and the
suspect. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
tion justifying the search did not initially come to
light after, or as a consequence of, the search. 65
Finally, because the fourth amendment requires
particularity in the description of the places to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized, the
scope of the search is limited by the warrant.'s
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Brief mention of the consequences of finding
substantive violations of the fourth amendment
should be made. While such violations can be
redressed in a number of ways, by far the most
significant remedy is the exclusionary rule, which
excludes the fruits of illegal searches and seizures
from admission into evidence against those whose
rights have been violated.s The exclusionary rule
has come under increasing attack of late by various
members of the Supreme Court,68 raising some
doubt regarding its future viability as the primary
remedy for violations of the fourth amendment.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
Not all warrantless searches and seizures offend
the fourth amendment. Apart from consent
65 Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 152 (1972) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) (quoting Judge Friendly's dissent at
the circuit court, 436 F.2d 30, 38-39 (2nd Cir. 1970)
(Friendly, J., dissenting)).
66 See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 467.
While warrants are generally required for constitutional
searches for and seizures of evidence, seizures of the
person-arrests-ordinarily need not be based on a war-
rant and will be upheld so long as the arresting officer
has probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has
been committed and that the person to be arrested
committed it. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411
(1976). The Court has recently held, however, that war-
rants are required if police must enter the home of a
suspect to make an arrest. Payton v. New York, 100 S.
Ct. 1371 (1980). See Note, Fourth Amendment-Nonexigent
Home Arrest Entries, 71 J. CRM. L. & C. 518 (1980). At
least for crimes committed outside the offender's home,
probable cause to believe that an offense is being com-
mitted in the presence of the arresting officer will always
justify a warrantless arrest. United States v. Watson, 423
U.S. 411.
67 See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAvE, & J. ISRAEL, supra note
24, at 184-91; Sunderland, supra note 24.
' See, e.g., ChiefJustice Burger's comments. The exclu-
sionary rule "is both conceptually sterile and practically
ineffective in accomplishing its stated objective," Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388,415 (1971)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting), and thus "this judically con-
trived doctrine" should perhaps be overruled. Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 501 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concur-
ring). Justice White is prepared to "join four or more
other Justices in substantially limiting the reach of the
exclusionary rule .... " Ia at 537 (White, J., dissenting).
See also Sunderland, supra note 24, at 353-65.
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searches, which will be dealt with in detail later,
two other types of exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement exist: searches of criminal suspects in
exigent circumstances which justify immediate po-
lice action or make obtaining a warrant imprac-
tical, and routine searches of nonsuspects in certain
circumstances.69
The exigent circumstance exceptions to the war-
rant rule involve instances where law enforcement
officers confront criminal suspects or encounter
criminal evidence in situations where resort to the
warrant procedure would be fruitless or imprac-
tical. If a suspect has been lawfully arrested-that
is, if probable cause exists to support the arrest-
-warrantless searches of the suspect's person are
permitted. 70 A lawful search of areas within the
suspect's immediate reach or control 7' may also be
made on the theory that, in the heat of the arrest
situation, he may attempt to harm the arresting
officer or to destroy evidence.72 Similarly, if a
searching officer has probable cause to believe that
a motor vehicle contains evidence, a warrantless
search is constitutionally valid if resort to the war-
rant procedure would likely result in the loss of the
evidence because of the vehicle's mobility. 73 An-
other recently articulated rationale for the vehicle
exception to the warrant rule is that one has only
a minimal expectation of privacy when riding in a
motor vehicle; thus, warrantless searches in that
context violate no substantial fourth amendment
interest. 74
As in the case of searches incident to arrest and
searches of vehicles, warrantless searches of houses
for weapons used by escaping suspects, as well as
for the suspects themselves, are justified if the
searching officer is in hot pursuit of the suspect
and has reasonable grounds to believe the suspect
is in the home and is dangerous. 75 Given the inher-
69 Professor Amsterdam has so conceptualized the ex-
ceptions to the warrant rule. Amsterdam, supra note 3, at
358-60.
70 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
71 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
72 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234-35;
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. at 763.
73 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 459-62;
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42,48-51 (1970); Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
74 South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367-68
(1976). But see Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979),
where the Supreme Court declared random police stops
of vehicles driven on public streets unlawful, unless the
police have reasonable suspicion that the driver or pas-
sengers have violated some law; Note, supra note 55.
75 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1967).
ent dangerousness of the situation, it would be
unreasonable to require officers in hot pursuit to
obtain warrants prior to searching. Similarly, a
limited body search of suspicious persons may also
be made without a warrant if the officer has rea-
sonable grounds, not necessarily rising to the level
of probable cause, to believe that the person is
armed and dangerous. 76 Such stops and frisks may
not go beyond what is necessary to detect the
presence of a weapon, 77 unless the suspect is placed
under arrest.78 Otherwise, the officer is entitled, in
the interest of preventing violent crime, to confront
and frisk the suspect in situations where probable
cause is lacking or warrants could not possibly be
obtained in time.
79
Finally, if an officer inadvertently comes upon
contraband or other manifestly criminal evidence
he may seize it without obtaining a warrant so long
as it is in plain view, he views it from a place in
which he is lawfully entitled to be,s8 and he reason-
ably believes the evidence to be incriminating
when he first views it.8 ' The premise of the plain
view exception to the warrant rule is that it is
logically impossible to obtain a warrant to seize
inadvertently discovered evidence prior to the mo-
ment of that discovery, and it is impractical to
require a warrant afterwards because the evidence
may be lost while the warrant is sought.8 2
The second class of exceptions to the warrant
rule involves instances where no reason exists to
suspect particular persons of criminal activity, but
public policy requires routine searches. Thus, war-
rantless searches are indiscriminately conducted of
persons and objects entering the United States
across international borders because of the special
difficulty of enforcing customs and immigration
76 Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63-64 (1968);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
77 Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. at 65-66; see also
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
78 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234; Adams
v. Williams, 407 U.S. at 147-49.
79 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 20-26.
80 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 464-72.
8' There must "be a nexus-automatically provided in
the case of fruits, instrumentalities or contraband-be-
tween the item to be seized and criminal behavior" which
is supplied for evidence lacking inherent criminal char-
acter by "cause to believe that the evidence sought will
aid in a particular apprehension or conviction." Warden
v. Hayden, 387 U.S. at 307. Sometimes, however, as in
inventory searches, police are permitted to handle objects
without regard to a present suspicion that they are evi-
dence of crime. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. 364 (1976).
82 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 467-68.
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laws without random border searches,ss and airline
passengers are routinely searched because of the
unusually dangerous character of air piracy.84 In-
ventory searches of vehicles properly taken into
police custody are permitted in order to protect
property inside the vehicle from loss. Finally, the
courts also permit warrantless searches of business
premises licensed to distribute regulated items such
as liquor or firearms.8
6
An important feature of these exceptions distin-
guishes them'from consent searches. With the pos-
sible exceptions of the automobile and plain view
cases, all of the nonconsensual exceptions to the
warrant rule are subject to two orders of scrutiny
in terms of their fourth amendment rationality.
8 7
The first order is inherent in the definition of the
exceptions themselves. Because each exception is a
carefully crafted accommodation of law enforce-
8 United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-19
(1977) (dictum); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413
U.S. 266, 272-73 (1973) (dictum).
8' United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1276 (5th
Cir. 1973); United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44,51 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 840 (1973). See Note, Fourth
Amendment-Airport Searches and Seizures: Where Will the
Court Land?, 71 J. CrIM. L. & C. 499 (1980).
" South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 368-72,
375-76.
8 See, e.g., United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972)
(firearms); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States,
397 U.S. 72, 76 (1970) (liquor).
Also, noncriminal administrative inspections of resi-
dential and commercial premises for fire, health, and
safety violations are subject to the general warrant re-
quirement. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307,311-
25 (1978); Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco,
387 U.S. 523 (1967). In these cases, however, warrants
may issue on evidence short of probable cause if reason-
able administrative or legislative standards for conduct-
ing the proposed inspection exist. 3 W. LAFAvE, supra
note 1, at 223.
87 To the extent that the automobile exception is based
on the theory that warrantless searches are permitted
because people have lesser privacy expectations in cars
than in other areas, see notes 73-74 & accompanying text
supra, it may be removed from fourth amendment pur-
view altogether. Thus no search occurs when police make
intrusions within the scope of the automobile exception
and the case is entirely without fourth amendment scope.
Similarly, when seizures are justified pursuant to the
plain view doctrine, the actions of the officer prior to the
discovery of the evidence are often held not to constitute
a search for that particular evidence since the discovery
was inadvertent. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
at 466; Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968).
This conclusion may not be entirely sound, however,
since it does not explain how the privacy expectations of
the one searched are diminished or relinquished through
the officer's inadvertent discovery.
ment and privacy interests, it is prima facie reason-
able to permit warrantless searches and seizures
whenever cases occur which fit within the defini-
tion of various exceptions. But apart from built-in
rationality, each of the exceptions is potentially
subject to a second order scrutiny of its reasonable-
ness. Since the privacy expectations of the person
searched are generally unaffected by the contexts
of the various exceptions,s8 fourth amendment
searches and seizures still exist notwithstanding the
fact that they are permitted without warrants. The
special circumstances supporting the exceptions to
the warrant rule do not take the cases outside the
purview of the fourth amendment. Thus, for ex-
ample, the privacy intrusions in legitimate stop
and frisk cases are still searches" that may arguably
be unreasonable under second order scrutiny even
though they occur in a prima facie reasonable con-
text.
This double scrutiny can be illustrated by the
following hypothetical: Suppose that Officer A has
a reasonable suspicion that X is presently armed
and about to rob a bank. Officer B, independently
of A, suddenly happens upon the scene but has no
reason to suspect X of any crime. Instead, B enjoys
harassing X. Officers A and B jointly conduct a
warrantless pat down of X (A to disarm a danger-
ous person, B to harass X) which turns up a weapon
which theyjointly and simultaneously remove from
X's pocket. X is charged with carrying a concealed
weapon. X moves to suppress the gun.
The case raises two orders of scrutiny: it appears
to be both a legitimate warrantless intrusion (prima
facie reasonable under first order rationality so far
as A is concerned) and also an unconstitutional
search (an unreasonable search by B under second
order rationality notwithstanding the fact that the
situation fits within the stop and frisk exception to
the warrant rule). Under .either analysis, a search
occurs which must be reasonable to withstand
fourth amendment scrutiny. Without hazarding an
opinion on the outcome of this hypothetical case,
the two-step scrutiny suggests an interesting aspect
of the nonconsensual exceptions to the warrant
rule: they define contexts which permit primafacie
reasonable warrantless intrusions, which may nev-
ertheless yield unreasonable searches.
88 See Wefing & Miles, Consent Searches and the Fourth
Amendment: Voluntariness and Third Party Problems, 5 SE'TON
HALL L. Rav. 211, 215 (1974).




Against this background, the issue of consent
searches as exceptions to the warrant rule can be
examined. Extensive syntheses of the caselaw have
been done by others' so much of that ground need
not be covered here. But while consent doctrine
may be stated relatively easily, its theoretical im-
plications have yet to be fully explored by either
the courts or the commentators.
Consent searches are categorically distinct from
the other exceptions to the warrant rule.9' Apart
from the necessity of establishing an initial expec-
tation of privacy in order to trigger the fourth
amendment, the state of mind of the person being
searched is, unlike the consent search situation,
irrelevant for purposes of the nonconsensual ex-
ceptions. 92 Moreover, while the nonconsensual ex-
ceptions evolved from a process of measuring police
conduct in each of the various areas against the
demands of fourth amendment reasonableness, the
consent exception generally finds its justification
not from an accommodation of various conflicting
interests, but rather from the view that consent in
and of itself makes an intrusion reasonable under
the fourth amendment.93
90 See, e.g., 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 1, at 610-778;
Bacigal, supra note 16, at 542-551; Wefing & Miles, supra
note 88; Comment, Consent to Search in Response to Police
Threats to Seek or to Obtain a Search Warrant: Some Alternatives,
71J. CRIM. L. & C. 163 (1980).
9' Professor Amsterdam lists consent as a separate cat-
egory of exception to the warrant rule. Amsterdam, supra
note 3, at 354.
92 Wefing & Miles, supra note 88, at 215.
93 "Consent can be characterized not as a waiver of an
absolute right to prevent the search, but rather as conduct
on the part of the occupant which renders the search
reasonable. So viewed, the standard of reasonableness is
arguably met by any uncoerced consent .... " Note,
Consent Searches: A Reappraisal Afier Miranda v. Arizona, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 130, 147 (1967). "The law recognizes
valid consent searches as an exception to the warrant
requirement because of their 'inherent reasonableness."'
Comment, Schneckloth v. Bnstamonte: The Question of Noncus-
todial and Custodial Consent Searches, 66J. CRiM. L. & C.
286, 287 (1975); see also Note, The Doctrine of Waiver and
Consent Searches, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW., 891, 899 (1974).
"Since the [fourth] amendment is for the individual's
own protection, once he effectively consents to a search
the resultant invasion of his privacy is not unconstitu-
tional. A 'consent,' then, is a legal term representing the
conclusion that an individual has waived his fourth
amendment right." Note, Effective Consent to Search and
Seizure, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 260 (1964). See also Comment,
Consent Search: Waiver of Fourth Amendment Rights 12 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 297, 298 (1968). "[Any search or taking of
evidence pursuant to his consent is not unreasonable."
People v. Gorg, 45 Cal. 2d 776, 782, 291 P.2d 469, 472
(1955); see also People v. Tremayne, 20 Cal. App. 3d
Somewhat surprisingly, the soundness of the as-
sumption that consensual searches are inherently
reasonable has thus far escaped critical attention.
After sketching an outline of consent doctrine in
this section, the remainder of the article will, by
posing a series of hypotheticals, expose the inade-
quacies of viewing consent searches as inherently
reasonable and suggest a preferable alternative
view.
Consent searches are particularly attractive law
enforcement instruments because they permit in-
trusions in situations lacking probable cause to
believe a search will reveal evidence of crime94 In
fact, the searching officer need have no suspicion
at all.95 On the other hand, consent searches also
often promote the consenter's civil liberties interests
by providing a prompt mechanism for exonerating
those mistakenly suspected of crime and convincing
police that seeking a warrant to support more
extensive and inconvenient searches is unjustified96
THE SUFFICIENCY OF CONSENT
The judicial definition of consent is not entirely
certain. The cases clearly require some outward
manifestation by the consenter giving the appear-
ance of consent. Some courts go farther in requiring
that the outward manifestation unambiguously re-
flect the consenter's intent to consent. Thus courts
have concluded that "no sane man" would consent
to a search certain to reveal incriminating evi-
1006, 1015, 98 Cal. Rptr. 193, 198 (1971) (consent estab-
lishes the "reasonable nature a search premised
thereon").
9 Policemen use consent searches for a variety of
reasons. When the occupant himself is not a suspect,
the premises may nevertheless contain evidence of
the unlawful activities of others. In this situation,
the consent search may often be used as a general
investigative tool, much like on-the-scene question-
ing of witnesses to a crime. Moreover, police often
undertake consent searches of a particular suspect's
premises. An occupant may be suspected of con-
cealing evidence of his crime within his home; if the
police do not have sufficient evidence to constitute
probable cause for securing a warrant, they may
attempt to obtain his permission to conduct a
search. Although this request has the disadvantage
of putting the suspect on his guard and enabling
him to destroy or better conceal any incriminating
evidence, it also, on occasion, simplifies the task of
the police. A refusal may reinforce suspicions con-
cerning the occupant, causing the police to center
their attention upon the particular suspect.
Note, 67 COLUM. L. REV., supra note 93, at 130-31.
95 See, e.g., the discussion of Schneckloth, notes 100-17
& accompanying text infra.
9 See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 228.
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dence 9 7 Whatever the person's permission may
indicate, he does not consent unless he is unaware
that the evidence would be discovered. Such a view
does not command widespread approval,98 but it
does evidence the difficulty in determining consent
in situations where its external manifestations are
not entirely consistent with perceived intent to
consent: "Consent is unequivocal and unques-
tioned only when it includes both [an 'internal'
state of mind and an 'external' performance]."
These difficulties aside, the cases are clear that
consent, however defined, must be voluntary in
order to exempt the situation from the warrant
requirement, assuming that the intrusion would be
a search and seizure absent consent.
The leading case is Schneckloth v. Bustamontel°° in
which the Supreme Court held that consent by one
not in police custody may be voluntary if it is given
in the absence of undue coercion, even though it is
not shown that the consenter actually knew he
could legally withhold consent. In Schneckloth, a
police officer stopped a vehicle because a headlight
was defective and, upon learning that the driver
was without a driver's license and that the car
belonged to passenger Acala's brother, asked Acala
if he could search the car. Under circumstances
described by the officer as "congenial," 101 Acala
gave permission and actually assisted in the search
which revealed three stolen checks, wadded up
under the left rear seat, which implicated fellow-
passenger Bustamonte in the crime of possessing a
check with intent to defraud.
The consent was upheld by the California courts
which found that "voluntariness is a question of
fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances, and that the state of a defendant's
knowledge is only one factor to be taken into
account in assessing the voluntariness of a con-
97 [N]o sane man who denies his guilt would actually
be willing that policemen search his room for con-
traband which is certain to be discovered. It follows
that when police identify themselves as such, search
a room, and find contraband in it, the occupant's
words or signs of acquiescence in the search, accom-
panied by denial of guilt, do not show consent; at
least in the absence of some extraordinary circum-
stance, such as ignorance that contraband is present.
Higgins v. United States, 209 F.2d 819, 820 (D.C. Cir.
1954). See also United States v. Viale, 312 F.2d 595, 601
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 903 (1963).
98 "[T]he... ["no sane man"] approach has not gained
general acceptance." 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 1, at 665.
"9 Weinreb, supra note 9, at 55.
'0o412 U.S. 218 (1973).
i i Id. at 221.
sent. ' '5°s But the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit concluded that "it is an
essential part of the State's initial burden to prove
that a person knows he has a right to refuse con-
sent."'1°3 In reversing the Ninth Circuit and siding
with the California approach, the Supreme Court
cautioned against "talismanic definitions" of vol-
untariness applicable to all situations.1°4 Instead
the consent issue should be resolved only after
assessing the "totality of all the surrounding cir-
cumstances" and determining whether consent was
coerced by explicit or implicit means, by implied
threat or covert force:0 s "Where there is coercion
there cannot be consent."'16 While a factor relevant
to voluntariness, "proof of knowledge of a right to
refuse ... [is not] the sine qua non of an effective
consent to a search.' ' 7 To require such proof
would be to jeopardize the continued viability of
consent searches, legitimate and necessary law en-
forcement tools, because except in rare cases the
prosecution would be unable to demonstrate that
the subject of the search in fact had known of his
right to refuse consent. The Court thought it "thor-
oughly impractical" to impose on the "informal
and unstructured" conditions of the normal con-
sent search a requirement that police advise persons
of their right to refuse as a precondition for valid
consent.i08 Although actual notice of constitutional
rights is necessary in order to waive, among others,
the right to counsel and to speedy trial,' the Court
saw no need to implant the waiver of rights concept
into the consent search situation. Unlike these other
rights which protect trial fairness, the fourth
amendment has nothing to do with promoting "the
fair ascertainment of truth at a criminal trial," but
instead protects the "security of one's privacy
against arbitrary intrusion by the police."' i Thus
"unlike those constitutional guarantees that protect
a defendant at trial, it cannot be said [of consent
searches that] every reasonable presumption ought
to be indulged against voluntary relinquish-
ment.""' "[T]here is nothing constitutionally sus-
'2 Id. at 223 (construing People v. Tremayne, 20 Cal.
App. 3d 1006, 98 Cal. Rptr..193 (1971); People v. Rob-
erts, 246 Cal. App. 2d 715, 55 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1966)).
'
0 3 Id. (construing Bustamonte v. Schneckloth, 448
F.2d 699 (1971)).
'04 Id. at 224.
l0 Id. at 226-35.
i06 Id. at 234.
107 id.
'08 Id. at 231-32.
109 id. at 237.
no Id. at 242.
i.i Id. at 243.
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pect in a person's voluntarily allowing a search.' ' 2
In fact, "the community has a real interest in
encouraging consent, for the resulting search may
yield necessary evidence for the solution and pros-
ecution of crime, evidence that may insure that a
wholly innocent person is not wrongly charged
with a criminal offense."" 3 Finally, the Court saw
the waiver approach as inconsistent with decisions
permitting third-party consent since third-party
consenters clearly could not waive the constitu-
tional rights of absent defendants.1 4 Rather than
constituting a waiver of fourth amendment rights,
the Court saw the issue in Schneckloth simply in
terms of the voluntariness of the permission to
search. Whether Acala made an enlightened choice
was not in question. The issue was whether his
choice was free. While the Court fleetingly inti-
mated that fairness might somehow be promoted
by assuring that consents are voluntarily given,
11 5
clearly the avoidance of governmental coercion is
the primary value promoted by Schneckloth.
Justice Marshall in dissent took another view,
finding objectionable the Court's "result that one
can choose to relinquish a constitutional right-
the right to be free of unreasonable searches-
without knowing that he has the alternative of
refusing to accede to a police request to search.""1
6
In his view, voluntary consent entails not just the
absence of coercion in permitting the intrusion but
also awareness that the intrusion need not be per-
mitted. i
17
THE NECESSITY FOR CONSENT
While Schneckloth indicates that voluntary con-




14 Id. at 245. For a criticism of the Supreme Court's
failure to recognize the waiver approach as applicable in
Schneckloth, see Wefing & Miles, supra note 88, at 217-252.
"5 Without elaborating more fully, the Court said in
discussing the definition of voluntariness: "[T]he criminal
law cannot be used as an instrument of unfairness, and
... the possibility of unfair and even brutal police tactics
poses a real and serious threat to civilized notions of
justice." Id. at 225.
"6Id. at 277 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"7 The dispute between the majority ("free choice"
means simply "uncoerced choice") and Justice Marshall
in dissent ("free choice" means "uncoerced and knowl-
edgeable choice") is reminiscent of the metaphysical
dispute about free will between "soft determinists" who
define free choice as "unconstrained choice" and "hard
determinists" and others who define free choice as
"choices which could have been otherwise than they
were." See, e.g., R. TAYLOR, METAPHYSICS 42-45 (1963).
and seizures from the warrant requirement, at least
in cases where the consent is clearly communicated
to the searching officer at the time of the search,
the case leaves unanswered the question whether
actual consent is also a necessary condition to
permit warrantless intrusions where the police rea-
sonably, but mistakenly, believe consent has been
given. Lower courts considering the issue have
reached different conclusions. For example, in
United States v. Elrod"5 the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that defendant's apparent con-
sent to a search of his hotel room was invalid
because he lacked mental capacity to consent even
though the police reasonably believed consent was
voluntarily and competently given.
No matter how genuine the belief of the officers is
that the consenter is apparently of sound mind and
deliberately acting, the search depending upon his
consent fails if it is judicially determined that he
lacked mental capacity. It is not that the actions of
the officers were imprudent or unfounded. It is that
the key to validity-consent-is lacking for want of
mental capacity, no matter how much concealed.ii 9
Other courts reject Elrod's atomistic conception and
adopt an essentially regulatory view by defining
the consent issue in terms of whether "the officers,
as reasonable men, could conclude that defendant's
consent was given."'12 Support for this position is
based on the theory that the fourth amendment is
only concerned "with discouraging unreasonable
activity on the part of law enforcement officers.
12 1
Attention is thus directed to the searcher's state of
mind. Because waiver of a constitutional right is
not involved, there is no special need to focus on
the state of mind of the alleged consenter. Under
this view, the fourth amendment does not confer a
right in the consenter to be free from searches, or
even to be free from warrantless searches, but
"8 441 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1971).
u9 Id. at 356.
'20 People v. Henderson, 33 Ill. 2d 225, 229-30, 210
N.E.2d 483, 485 (1965). See also People v. Lumpkin, 64
Mich. App. 123, 235 N.W.2d 166 (1975) (police officer
entitled to rely on defendant's unequivocal expression of
consent regardless of defendant's fear of trouble if he
refused consent).
For another example where actual consent is held
unnecessary to support a consent search, see People v.
Hargrave, 40 Misc. 2d 556, 243 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1963)
(consent "implied" where an unconscious patient in a
hospital is disrobed in preparation for emergency treat-
ment, and a gun found on his person).
121 People v. Gorg, 45 Cal. 2d 776, 783, 291 P.2d 469,
473 (1955).
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rather only a right to be free from unreasonable
searches.1
2
The difference in judicial opinion regarding the
necessity of actual consent in situations where it
reasonably appears to have been given is further
illustrated by the third-party apparent authority
cases. While third-party consent will be considered
in some detail later, it is useful to consider the
apparent authority doctrine here since it relates to
the necessity of consent problem. Some courts, in
the atomistic tradition of Elrod, have found fourth
amendment violations in situations where pplice
conduct searches permitted by persons whom they
reasonably, but mistakenly, believe have power to
authorize a search for evidence to be used against
an absent party13 On the other hand, some courts
reach the opposite conclusion based on the view
that the fourth amendment is concerned with "dis-
couraging unreasonable activity on the part of law
enforcement officers," a concern not offended when
police reasonably but mistakenly assume that
third-party consent has been given.
12
AUTHORITY TO CONSENT
Although not usually conceptualized as a third-
party consent case, Schneckloth may be so under-
,22 See, e.g., People v. Tremayne, 20 Cal. App. 3d at
1015, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
123 For example, in United States ex re. Cabey v.
Mazurkiewicz, 431 F.2d 839 (3d Cir. 1970), a wife's
voluntary consent to a police search of a garage, sepa-
rately leased by her husband, was invalid against the
husband since she lacked an equal right of access to the
garage and thus lacked actual authority to consent even
though she reasonably appeared to possess authority.
,24 See, e.g., People v. Gorg, 45 Cal. 2d 776, 291 P.2d
469, where one Stevens gave permission to police to enter
and search a room in Stevens' house occupied by the
defendant. In upholding the search the court said:
Defendant was living in the Stevens home, and
it is clear that whether he was in fact a tenant,
servant, or guest, Stevens believed that he had at
least joint control over his quarters and the right to
enter them ... and authorize a search thereof. Un-
der these circumstances the officers were justified in
concluding that Stevens had the authority over his
home that he purported to have, and there was
nothing unreasonable in their acting accordingly.
In this proceeding we are not concerned with en-
forcing defendant's rights under the law of trespass
and landlord and tenant, but with discouraging
unreasonable activity on the part of law enforce-
ment officers.... [W]hen as in this case the officers
have acted in good faith with the consent and at
the request of a home owner in conducting a search,
evidence so obtained cannot be excluded merely
because the officers may have made a reasonable
mistake as to the extent of the owner's authority.
Id. at 783, 291 P.2d at 473.
stood. The evidence obtained by the police in that
case was eventually used against Bustamonte, a
passenger in the car at the time copassenger Acala
consented to the search. While not addressing the
issue, the Court was nevertheless on firm ground
in permitting Acala's third-party consent to vali-
date the seizure of the check admitted in evidence
against Bustamonte.
A variety of theories have been advanced as
foundations for third-party consent. Courts some-
times utilize an agency relationship, or its absence,
between the consenter and the defendant as the
basis for validating third-party consents. 15 More
often, however, doctrines of assumption of risk by
the defendant and the consenter's joint access or
control with the defendant over the premises or
effects sought to be inspected are employed.
126
The Supreme Court has recognized both the
assumption of risk and joint access theories. In
Frazier v. Cupp'27 the Court held that the defendant
had assumed the risk that his cousin would permit
someone to look inside a duffel bag, in which the
two stored clothing, which was left in the cousin's
possession.12s Although the police in Frazier were
investigating the cousin and not the defendant,
and thus inadvertently came upon evidence in
"plain view" in the bag implicating the defendant,
the Court has made clear in other cases that con-
sents may also validly be given even if the police
seek third-party permission to search when they
suspect another of crime. Thus, in United States v.
Matlockl29 the Court upheld the consent of a Mrs.
Graff to search a house in which she said she shared
a room with the defendant, who had been arrested
on the front lawn of the house immediately prior
to Mrs. Graff's consent. Mrs. Graff's consent was
valid since she possessed "common authority over
..the premises or.effects sought to be inspected.
13 0
The Court found third-party consent authority to
rest,
on mutual use of the property by persons generally
having joint access or control for most purposes, so
125 See Bacigal, supra note 16, at 546; Wefing & Miles,
supra note 88, at 253; Note, Third Party Consent to Search
and Seizure, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 797, 801 (1966).
126 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 1, at 695-98. See Stoner v.
California, 376 U.S. 483, 488 (1964), where the Court
refused to permit "the rights protected by the Fourth
Amendment ... to be eroded by strained applications of
the law of agency.... "
'2 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
'2S Id. at 740.
1294 15 U.S. 164 (1974).
130Id. at 171.
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that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-
inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in
his own right and that the others have assumed the
risk that one of their number might permit the
common area to be searched.1
3
1
The Court did not explain to whom and at what
time it must be reasonable to recognize the co-
habitant's right to consent. While the reference
may refer to the reasonableness of the police per-
ception of authority at the time of the intrusion,
suggesting that apparent authority may sufficiently
validate third-party consents in cases where police
reasonably, but mistakenly, believe authority to
consent exists,13 2 it may also, or alternatively, refer
to the general reasonableness in light of the fourth
amendment policy of recognizing valid consent in
the situation regardless of the policeman's state of
mind at the time of the intrusion.
The assumption of risk and joint access theories
emphasize different perspectives. The former fo-
cuses on the circumstances as reasonably perceived
by the defendant while the latter attends to the
interests of the consenter to permit the intrusion
"in his own right. ' 133 Thus, in cases where the
consenter has actual rights ofjoint access which are
unknown to the defendant, the assumption of risk




Not all voluntary consents within the meaning
of Schneckloth necessarily result in admission of the
evidence seized pursuant to the search. Intrusions
must not exceed express or implied limits or qual-
ifications which establish the permissible scope of
consent.135 Evidentiary fruits derived from searches
outside the scope of a given consent are ordinarily
131 Id. at 171 n.7.
i32 The Matlock Court specifically left open the issue of
the sufficiency of apparent authority as a basis for valid
third-party consent. Id. at 177 n.14.
3 See 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 1, at 54 (Supp. 1980).
"a Id. Cases may exist where the assumption of risk
and joint access theories are at odds. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that X rents part of a house to A but rents no portion
of a barn to anyone. A, however, leads B to believe that
A has exclusive control over the barn. B reasonably relies
on A's representation and stores marijuana in the barn.
X, in fact the possessor of exclusive control over the barn,
gives police permission to search it. While it is difficult to
see how B assumed the risk of X's consent since he had
no reason at all to anticipate X's action, X, as possessor
of access to the barn clearly has an interest in her own
right in consenting. X's interest, however surprising to B,
is held to control and the evidence is admissible against
B. See Commonwealth v. Latshaw, 481 Pa. 298, 392 A.2d
1301 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 931 (1979).
13" See 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 1, at 624-32.
excluded unless the police possessed warrants or
the case is covered by other exceptions to the
warrant rule.' Thus it is possible to relinquish
areas of privacy by permitting limited searches
while retaining privacy interests in areas outside
the scope of consent: "A person's consent ... is
relevant only to the extent that he has a protected
interest. Therefore, the scope of a search that con-
sent legitimates is congruent with the realm of
privacy that the consent waives. ' ' 37 While these
considerations provide some inherent rationality
for consent searches by checking unduly intrusive
governmental actions, there may still be, as shown
later, cases of unreasonable intrusions within the
scope of consents voluntarily given.
While the consenter clearly has power to define
the scope of consent, whether consent once given
can be withdrawn is less clear. Some take the view
that a search becomes reasonable the moment con-
sent is given. Thus, the consenter "has no more
right to obstruct it than any other reasonable
search-by warrant or incidental to arrest for ex-
ample. ' i Others, however, suggest that consents
"may be withdrawn or limited at any time prior to
the completion of the search."' 39
THEORETICAL CONSEQUENCES OF VALID CONSENT
While the practical consequence of voluntary
and valid consent of either the two- or three-party
variety is the admission of evidence seized through
the warrantless entries to which consent was given,
the justification for this result is not clear. Most of
the attention in the consent area has been focused
on the problem of defining valid consents rather
than on explaining why, once found, they justify
warrantless intrusions. Perhaps explication of the
theoretical consequences of consent searches is
thought unnecessary because they are so obviously
reasonable as fourth amendment matters that they
require no discussion. So long as within the scope
of the consent, nothing significant would seem to
hinge upon whether consensual intrusions are con-
ceptualized as permissible searches or nonsearches
outside the purview of the fourth amendment. To
the extent that opinion exists on the subject, how-
ever, the predominant view is that consent removes
the case from the amendment's scope.
40
For example, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire141 the
Supreme Court found that no fourth amendment
136 Id.
137 Weinreb, supra note 9, at 54.
1 Note, 67 COLUM. L. REV., supra note 93, at 157.
' 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 1, at 634.
141 See note 93 supra.
14' 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (plurality opinion).
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search or seizure occurred when police went to the
home of an incarcerated defendant and questioned
his wife about his possession of guns, and she, on
her own initiative and out of a desire to help her
husband and to cooperate with the police, turned
over to them a weapon and some clothing which,
unbeknownst to her, implicated her husband in a
kidnapping and murder. The Court found that
"[t]o hold that the conduct of the police here was
a search and seizure would be to hold, in effect,
that a criminal suspect has constitutional protec-
tion against the adverse consequences of a sponta-
neous, good-faith effort by his wife to clear him of
suspicion., 14 2 The Court's conclusion is not specif-
ically based on a consent theory, but rather on the
view that if any search occurred, it was by the wife,
a private person incapable of imbuing the situation
with the state action necessary to trigger the fourth
amendment. But consent theory, while not dis-
cussed by the Court, would seem to provide an
alternative basis for its decision. Coolidge is cited by
the Schneckloth Court as bolstering the view that
legitimate, voluntary consent may be given in the
absence of knowledge of a right to refuse consent.14
Indeed, except for the fact that Mrs. Coolidge
herself participated in the actual finding of the
evidence, a fact of little significance since the police
had initiated the intrusion, the Coolidge situation
seems indistinguishable from Schneckloth. At the
time they were encountered by the police, both
Acala and Mrs. Coolidge had expectations of pri-
vacy which they relinquished by voluntarily assist-
ing the police in their discovery of evidence. In
both cases, the fact of consent would seem to vitiate
the pre-existing privacy interest, thus removing
both cases from the scope of the fourth amendment.
SUMMARY OF CONSENT DOCTRINE
Schneckloth indicates that voluntary consent, de-
fined as noncoerced consent, removes the warrant
requirement where consent is unambiguously com-
municated to the searcher. Whether actual consent
is also a necessary condition for such removal is not
clear. Cases such as Elrod hold that actual consent
is necessary while other cases hold that reasonable
belief by the searcher that consent exists is suffi-
cient, even if actual consent is not given. Third-
party consent is valid in situations where the de-
142 Id. at 489-90. For a similar case holding there was
no search because state action was lacking, see Ritter v.
Commonwealth, 210 Va. 732, 173 S.E.2d 799 (1970).
143 The Court rejected the argument that Mrs. Cool-
idge became an agent of the police when she brought the
evidence to the police. 403 U.S. at 487.
'4 412 U.S. at 234 n.15.
fendant can be said to have assumed the risk that
it would be given or where the consenter has
sufficient access to and control of the premises to
consent in his own right. To be effective, consent
searches must not exceed their express or implied
scope as set by the consenter. Consent searches are
generally viewed as avoiding fourth amendment
scope.
Left unanswered by the cases and the commen-
tators are a variety of important questions. Among
the more theoretically interesting are the following:
Exactly, what does the consenter relinquish when
he voluntarily consents to a police intrusion? Does
he simply relinquish his right to be free from
warrantless searches, or, as Justice Marshall inti-
mates in his Schneckloth dissent, does the consenter
relinquish his right to be free from unreasonable
searches as well? Does it matter which of these
conceptions is adopted so long as the search is
conducted within the scope of the consent? Could
there be unreasonable searches within the scope of
voluntary consent?1 45 Since the consenter invaria-
bly relinquishes privacy expectations, is the state
of mind of the searching officer in any way relevant
once it is found that voluntary consent is given?
These questions and others may be subsumed
under a general inquiry into the soundness of the
conclusion that searches and seizures within the
scope of a voluntarily given consent are necessarily
reasonable. The remainder of this article will cri-
tique this conclusion.
CONSENT SEARCHES AS "INHERENTLY
REASONABLE"-A CRITIQUE
While generally unproblematical in its practical
effect, the view that voluntary consent to a search
invariably renders the intrusion reasonable for
fourth amendment purposes is unsound theoreti-
cally and prevents correct resolution of some con-
sent problems. This unsoundness can be illustrated
by consideration of a series of hypotheticals, rep-
resenting instances of consent freely given in non-
coercive settings.
146
145 This question is raised briefly in Comment, Consent
Search: Waiver of Fourth Amendment Rights, 12 ST. Louis U.
LJ. 297, 298 (1968).
1461 seek to avoid the problem of determining when,
and what type of, coercion, subtle or otherwise, may cast
doubt upon the voluntariness of consents. Most consent
search litigation deals with this problem. For an excellent
summary of such cases, see 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 1, at
610-77. By the same token, I am not here concerned with
problems of who can, or should be able to, consent in
third-party situations. Again, these problems are the
subject of a rather rich body of caselaw ably summarized
in id. at 691-778. For a discussion of problems generated
by the caselaw, see Weinreb, supra note 9, at 58-64; Note,
1980]
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THE PARADIGM REASONABLE CONSENT SEARCH
Most consent searches conducted within the
scope of consent raise no serious fourth amendment
problems. Consider this case: The police suspect
Krook of dealing in illegal drugs but lack sufficient
evidence to make an arrest or obtain a search
warrant. Officer Kopp decides to confront Krook
and to question him, hoping to be invited into his
home where Kopp suspects the drugs are kept.
Kopp, in full police uniform, goes to Krook's home,
speaks briefly and amicably with him on his front
porch and asks if he might enter the house and
look around the living room. Krook, a former law
student well-versed in fourth amendment lore,
knows that he need not permit police entry in this
situation but, after a moment's thought and a
recollection that no drugs are in the house, never-
theless invites Kopp into the house. 4 7 Unfortu-
nately for Krook, he has forgotten about a mari-
juana plant, obviously identifiable as such, he has
growing in his living room in plain view of Kopp.
Kopp arrests Krook for illegally growing marijuana
and seizes the plant.
Upholding Krook's actions and admitting the
plant into evidence presents little problem. While
Krook legitimately expects to be free from un-
wanted and warrantless governmental intrusions
into his living room, he relinquishes his privacy
expectations by consenting to the intrusion. Since
there are no longer expectations of privacy vis-a-vis
Kopp and the living room, no search occurs when
Kopp enters and looks around the room. Seizure
of the plant, in plain view of Kopp, is thus permis-
Third-Party Consent Searches: An Alternative Analysis, 41 U.
CHI. L. REv. 121 (1973). I neglect these matters because
others have treated them and because I am concerned
here with the issue of the theoretical consequences of
valid consents once they are given and not with problems
of determining their existence.
147 Krook's actions in these circumstances are not nec-
essarily against his interests even if he knows Kopp
suspects him of dealing in drugs and even if he has drugs
stashed in the house.
[A] freely given consent may serve to dispel ...
[police] suspicion and ... clear the occupant ....
Since the criminal realizes that consenting to the
search will divert police suspicions, he may consent,
hoping either that the police -will not bother to
search at all or, if they do, will not find the carefully
hidden evidence.... Finally, the less sophisticated
criminal may consent to the police search because
he has reasoned, rightly or wrongly, that if the
police have enough on him to want to search, the
Igame is up' and the best course is to curry favor by
cooperating with them.
Note, 67 COLUM. L. REv., supra note 93, at 131.
sible. No reason exists to regulate this kind of
governmental conduct nor to protect an atomistic
privacy interest in Krook.
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES BEYOND THE SCOPE OF
CONSENT
Under the same facts suppose that, instead of
remaining in the living room, Kopp barges into
Krook's bedroom and discovers the plant. The
scope of Krook's consent extends only to the living
room. He thus retains privacy expectations in the
bedroom which are violated by Kopp's intrusion.
Hence, an unreasonable fourth amendment search
and seizure occurs when Kopp enters, looks around
the room and confiscates the plant. Because he has
no right to be in the bedroom when he sees the
plant, the plain view exception is inapposite. Not
only is a protected realm of privacy violated but
an undesirable police action, to be deterred in the
future if possible, occurs. For both atomistic and
regulatory reasons, the evidence should be ex-
cluded.
Significantly, this example does not call into
question the thesis that consent searches are invar-
iably reasonable since the search here occurs out-
side the scope of consent. Had Kopp remained in
the living room, within the area of consent, no
fourth amendment intrusion would have occurred.
UNCOMMUNICATED ACTUAL CONSENT
Consider the following variation on the same
theme: Suppose that when Kopp asks if he might
enter Krook's home to visit, he does not hear
Krook's spoken invitation into the house. When
the invitation is spoken Krook whirls and enters
the house. Thus to Kopp it appears that no consent
is given and, indeed, that Krook intends an im-
mediate termination of the conversation. Kopp
nevertheless follows Krook into the living room,
sees the marijuana plant, arrests Krook, and seizes
the plant.
Technically, it appears that Krook consents to
the intrusion. 5 s He manifests his intent to consent
through his external performance of speaking the
149 .nTsi
liiVILULlUsl. I he situation is free from coercion,
especially if Krook assumes that Kopp hears his
invitation to enter the house, thus indicating vol-
untary consent under Schneckloth. The intrusion
occurs within the scope of the consent. Krook
148 There appear to be no reported cases dealing with
the problem of uncommunicated consent.
14 See note 99 & accompanying text supra.
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permits Kopp's entry into the living room and has
thus relinquished his privacy expectations vis-a-vis
that room and that invitee. No search occurs even
though from Kopp's perspective the case has all
the earmarks of a blatant violation of privacy.
Viewing such a case as totally outside the fourth
amendment's scope is troubling. While from an
atomistic point of view no fourth amendment in-
terests appear t6 be offended, the regulatory point
of view may demand that the undesirable police
behavior be measured by fourth amendment rea-
sonableness.
Nevertheless, there are problems with seeking to
regulate this kind of police conduct through the
exclusionary rule,15 especially if the hope is to
deter its future occurrence. After all, if Kopp is not
deterred in the instant case by the belief that his
actions offend Krook's fourth amendment rights,
why should he be any more deterred in the future
if the evidence seized in Krook's house is held
inadmissible? As Professor Amsterdam has ob-
served in the context of his similar hypothetical:
"[1]f a policeman is not deterred from conducting
a search by the knowledge that he will lose its fruits
on the facts as he thinks they are, he will certainly
not be deterred by the unanticipated contingency
of losing its fruits on the facts as he thinks they
aren't."'51 Excluding the marijuana plant seems
inefficacious to specially deter Kopp since he ap-
pears to be an incorrigible violator of fourth
amendment rights. Moreover, excluding the plant
appears unnecessary to deter other police officers
from following Kopp's example. If the evidence is
held to be admissible, other officers will receive
little incentive to trod upon fourth amendment
rights in hopes that unknown consent has been
given. Such cases will surely be rare. In most
instances, following Kopp's example will result in
obvious violations of the fourth amendment and
the exclusion of evidentiary fruits derived there-
from.
The position ofJustice Whitejoined by Justices
Harlan and Stewart, in his dissent to a dismissal of
150 See Feguer v. United States, 302 F.2d 214, 248-50
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 872 (1962), where the
court held admissible evidence obtained from a room
police believed the defendant was occupying but which
had in fact been abandoned by the defendant. While the
fourth amendment might well have been violated had
the facts been as the police believed them to be, because
defendant had abandoned the premises the search "could
not possibly have violated any constitutional right of the
defendant." Id at 250.
'5' See note 48 supra; Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 369.
certiorari in Massachusetts v. Painten'52 is relevant to
the present problem.
The position of the courts below must rest on a
view that a policeman's intention to offend the
Constitution if he can achieve his goal in no other
way contaminates all of his later behavior.... The
expanded exclusionary rule applied in the opinions
below would be defensible only ifwe felt it important
to deter policemen from acting lawfully but with the
plan-the attitude of mind-of going further and
acting unlawfully if the lawful conduct produces
insufficient results. We might wish that policemen
would not act with impure plots in mind, but I do
not believe that wish a sufficient basis for excluding,
in the supposed service of the Fourth Amendment,
probative evidence obtained by actions-if not
thoughts-entirely in accord with the Fourth
Amendment and all other constitutional require-
ments.
I '3
Yet, there remain reasons for concern if Kopp's
actions are not stamped as illegal. Some induce-
ment to violate real fourth amendment interests in
the future is provided if Kopp's actions are upheld
since the police will know that some apparent
violations of the fourth amendment will neverthe-
less be sustained if unknown consent has fortui-
tously been given. Perhaps the deterrent purpose
of the exclusionary rule requires its invocation in
any case where failure to exclude evidence presents
any inducement to violate the fourth amendment
in the future.
But apart from considerations of deterrence, a
fundamental principle seems offended if Kopp's
actions are upheld. Why should he be permitted to
benefit, by obtaining an arrest and conviction,
from his attempted wrongdoing? Are there not
dangers in permitting purposeful disregard of con-
stitutional protections by governmental officials to
be so rewarded? Should not such irrational conduct
be officially conldemned by the fourth amendment
rather than viewed as extraconstitutional matters?
The wisd6m of one commentator seems appro-
priate here:
It is... imperative to have a practical procedure
by which courts can review alleged violations of
constitutional rights and articulate the meaning of
those rights. The advantage of the exclusionary
rule-entirely apart from any direct deterrent ef-
fect-is that it provides an occasion for judicial
review, and it gives credibility to the constitutional
'52 389 U.S. 560 (1968) (cert. dismissed as improvi-
dently granted).
"5 Id. at 564-65 (White, J., dissenting).
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guarantees. By demonstrating that society will at-
tach serious consequences to the violation of consti-
tutional rights, the exclusionary rule invokes and
magnifies the moral and educative force of the law.
Over the long term this may integrate some fourth
amendment ideals into the value system or norms of
behavior of law enforcement agencies.'54
But if regulatory interests demand scrutiny of
Kopp's actions, such scrutiny is impossible if
Krook's consent has removed the case from the
fourth amendment's scope.1 55 Unlike the stop and
frisk hypothetical posed above, where a prima facie
reasonable search was nevertheless subjected to a
second order of rational scrutiny, such second-order
scrutiny of Krook's case is theoretically impossible
if his consent renders Kopp's intrusion a non-
search.
It may well he that Kopp's actions would survive
attack under the fourth amendment. Courts of an
atomistic bent considering such cases may, in light
of pressing law enforcement interests and the trend
toward limiting the application of the exclusionary
rule, carve out further exceptions to the warrant
rule so as to permit warrantless searches in such
cases of actual, but uncommunicated, consent.
However, such cases might be viewed as unconsti-
tutional intrusions. The point is that scrutiny of
cases of arguably unreasonable police intrusions
into otherwise protected areas of privacy should
not be foreclosed altogether simply because consent
was given.
UNAPPARENT ACTUAL CONSENT
A variant of the uncommunicated actual consent
problem can be posed in a third-party setting.
Suppose that when Kopp goes to Krook's house
the door is answered not by Krook, but by Earl, a
man in a uniform with "Earl's TV Repair" written
across its front. An "Earl's TV Repair" truck is
parked outside the house. Kopp asks Earl if Krook
is at home. Earl replies in the negative and, after
telling Kopp that he must hurry back to his repair
work on Krook's TV, invites Kopp into the living
room to wait for Krook's return. Kopp accepts
Earl's invitation, waits in the living room for Krook
to arrive, arrests him for growing the marijuana,
and seizes the plant. From all appearances Earl is
a mere invitee in Krook's home. In fact, he is a co-
'5 Oaks, supra note 25, at 756.
's In addition to the problem of fourth amendment
scope, Krook may also have standing problems if his
consent is seen as vitiating his privacy expectations. See
notes 52-57 & accompanying text supra.
tenant of Krook who owns his own TV repair
business and happened to be repairing his coten-
ant's TV at the time Kopp happened along.
From Kopp's perspective, Earl lacks authority to
consent to the entry into the living room. 15 But
actually Earl is clothed in authority by virtue of
his right of joint access and control of the prem-
ises.' 57 Moreover, Krook may be held to have as-
sumed the risk of Earl's consent.'
58
As with the analogous apparent authority cases,
where police reasonably, but erroneously, believe
authority to consent exists, courts may split in
deciding the validity of Earl's consent where police
reasonably but erroneously believe authority to
consent does not exist. Courts following Elrod'
would seemingly have little problem in sustaining
Earl's consent since it actually existed under Frazier
and perhaps also under Matlock.16° Moreover,
Krook's expectation of privacy is diminished to the
extent he shares the premises with Earl.161 Thus,
Kopp apparently makes no search or seizure since
the consent renders the intrusion reasonable. On
the other hand, those courts adopting the apparent
authority doctrine'6 may, for the reasons discussed
in connection with the uncommunicated consent
case, be inclined to view the unreasonableness of
Kopp's action as a basis for excluding the evi-
dence."6 However, to the extent that the apparent
1
6 6 See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 534 F.2d 95 (7th
Cir. 1976).
1s7 See notes 129-31 & accompanying text supra.
158 See notes 127-28 & accompanying text supra.
59 See notes 118-19 & accompanying text supra. It




Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731; United States v.
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164. The Matlock standard does not
clearly indicate whether Earl's consent would be valid.
See notes 131-33 & accompanying text supra.
161 See Comment, Third Party Consent Searches: The Right
to Exculpate, 69 J. CRIM. L. & C. 92, 101-02 (1978).
1
6 2 See note 123 & accompanying text supra.
163 The apparent authority rule rests upon the prop-
osition that 'the regulation of police behavior is
what the fourth amendment is all about'; suppres-
sion based upon a hindsight determination that
there was not actual authority would have no de-
terrent effect, for in future cases the police can only
act upon what reasonably appears to be true. This
being so, it is in no sense inconsistent to suggest that
if the police did not have a reasonable belief that the
consenting party had authority (whatever the truth
of the matter may later be determined to be), then
the evidence should be suppressed for the purpose
of deterring the police from acting upon similar
appearances in the future and, in all probability,
violating real fourth amendment interests.
2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 1, at 724.
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authority doctrine is based on an accommodation
to law enforcement interests, as an expression of
judicial reluctance to deprive society of evidentiary
fruits gleaned in situations where police conduct is
reasonable,1" it does not follow that courts em-
bracing the doctrine would necessarily be led to
deprive society of fruits gathered from obviously
guilty persons' houses simply because officers act




In any event, the unapparent actual consent
situation exposes an arguably unreasonable search
occurring within the scope of a valid consent. The
case thus seems an appropriate candidate for fourth
amendment scrutiny. The point here, as in the
preceding hypothetical, is not that Kopp necessar-
ily performs an unreasonable search and seizure by
accepting Earl's invitation to enter the house, but
rather that examination of the fourth amendment
meaning of his unreasonable action should not be
foreclosed simply because Earl consented.
164 To a large extent, such a theory underlies the
apparent authority cases.
When the police are engaged in the difficult and
sometimes dangerous business of solving crime, ac-
tions which they take in a good faith attempt to do
their job should not be reviewed by courts against
a holier-than-thou standard of exceeding technical
complexity which the police officers cannot realist-
ically be expected to administer. In other words,
judicial determinations of the 'reasonableness' of
third party consent searches cannot properly ignore
the circumstances of the search as they appeared to the
police at the time the decision to search was made.
Specifically, if the police obtain consent to search a
house from someone who reasonably appears to
them to be in control of the premises and in a
position to authorize them to enter, it would be of
little social utility for a court subsequently to rebuke
the officers by excluding the evidence they obtained
during the search on the ground that the person
whose consent they accepted in good faith was the
'general householder' rather than the 'exclusive pos-
sessor.'
Reinforcing this line of reasoning is the consid-
eration that the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule rests upon a 'police misconduct' rationale: that
is, unlawfully seized evidence is excluded from trials
in order to deter the police from engaging in unlaw-
ful conduct. If this deterrent effect exists at all, it
quite clearly is of no effect when the police, believing
that they are acting lawfully, conduct a search
which later turns out to be 'unlawful' because they
failed to observe a subtle distinction drawn by a
defense attorney with 20/20 hindsight.
Comment, Relevance of the Absent Party's Whereabouts in
Third Party Consent Searches, 53 B.U.L. REv. 1087, 1110
(1973).
ins See note 150 supra.
THE UNIDENTIFIED INTRUDER
A final version of the Kopp-Krook scenario is
useful in examining the inherent rationality of
consent searches. Suppose that instead of appear-
ing in police uniform, Kopp poses as an encyclo-
pedia salesman whom Krook invites into his living
room to discuss a possible purchase. Upon entering
the room Kopp sees the marijuana which he seizes
after identifying himself as a police officer and
arresting Krook.
While Krook's entry is facilitated by deception,
it is not necessarily characterized by coercion. In-
deed, his entry is probably permitted by existing
caselaw. Not only does Schneckloth's emphasis on
consent as the absence of coercion not condemn it,
but other cases give it actual support. For example,
in Hoffa v. United States, 66 Partin, an acquaintance
of Hoffa's, became an undercover government in-
former and, after frequent visits to Hoffa's hotel
room, gave incriminating evidence against Hoffa
gathered from the visits. In rejecting a claim that
the informer's failure to disclose his role as a gov-
ernment agent "vitiated [Hoffa's] consent" to the
numerous entries, 67 the Court said:
In the present case, however, it is evident that no
interest legitimately protected by the Fourth
Amendment is involved .... Partin was in the suite
by invitation, and every conversation which he heard
was either directed to him or knowingly carried on
in his presence. The petitioner, in a word, was not
relying on the security of the hotel room; he was
relying upon his misplaced confidence that Partin
would not reveal his wrongdoing .... Neither this
Court nor any member of it has ever expressed the
view that the Fourth Amendment protects a wrong-
doer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he
voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal
it.168
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in
United States v. Raines6 9 upheld the actions of a
police officer who gained entry to .the defendant's
home, and subsequently obtained evidence against
him, by posing as a concerned friend of an ac-
quaintance of the defendant who had been arrested
for buying heroin from the defendant earlier that
evening. The Court found that although the con-
sent to the officer's entry had been obtained by
ruse, defendant's fourth amendment rights were
166 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
'67 Id. at 300.
'68 Id. at 302.




not violated since no search or seizure occurred
even though the officer went to defendant's home
intending to gather evidence against him.
17 0
Other courts have found consent unaffected by
the fact that police gain entry to defendants' homes
by impersonating printing press operators,17' Ger-
man chemists, 172 hippies,'
173 
and real estate cus-
tomers174 and to defendant's private hospital room
by posing as a porter responsible for cleaning the
room.' 75 While some courts have invalidated con-
sent precipitated by police ruse, 176 it more generally
appears that consent given
to another to intrude into an area or activity other-
wise protected by the Fourth Amendment ... is not
vitiated merely because it would not have been given
but for the nondisclosure or affirmative misrepresen-
tation which made the consenting party unaware of
the other person's identity as a police officer or police
agent.'
1 77
The fourth amendment ramifications for both
innocent citizens and guilty offenders are startling.
If the government is authorized to enter private
premises through the use of any ruse, much has been
gained for law enforcement. 'Similarly, owing to the
general openness with which Americans manage
their private premises, the government could main-
tain almost constant interior surveillance of private
areas previously protected under the amendment. A
greater compromise of the fourth amendment could
hardly be envisioned.... With very little imagina-
tion, but some planning and control, government
authorities could employ a host of ... schemes to
gain entry on a repeated basis to practically any
private area. Having established a legally permissi-
ble vantage point, it would seem senseless for the
officials to worry about procuring a neutral magis-
trate's authorization for a search. A building inspec-
tor's or meterman's uniform would be far more
convenient than obtaining a search warrant. Besides,
17
0 Id. at 800-01.
171 United States v. Guidry, 534 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir.
1976).
17 United States v. Hagen, 397 F.2d 460 (7th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1027 (1970).
173 Bickar v. Gray, 380 F. Supp. 804 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
'74 State v. Anglada, 144 N.J. Super. 358, 365 A.2d
720 (1976).
175 People v. Manieri, 83 Misc. 2d 798, 373 N.Y.S.2d
504 (1975).
'76 See, e.g., United States v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 299
(5th Cir. 1977): "It is a well established rule that a
consent search is unreasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment if the consent was induced by the deceit, trickery or
misrepresentation of the... [government] agent."
i77 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 1, at 680.
search warrants require probable cause; undercover
ruses ... do not. Thus, the warrant requirement
would be resorted to only for searches and seizures
in which undercover work would be physically or
economically unfeasible.' 7"
Surely, an overly rigid consent doctrine should
not preclude examination of unidentified police
intruder cases such as the encyclopedia salesman
ruse. Far from being inherently reasonable consent
situations, such cases beg for fourth amendment
scrutiny.
This not to say that all unidentified intruder
cases are necessarily violative of the fourth amend-
ment. The courts might recognize the important
law enforcement value undercover police agents
provide' 79 and strike compromises in these cases,
perhaps finding valid consent if, and only if, the
defendant admits the undercover officer solely for
the purpose of participating in a crime'80 or only
when police agents choose to become such after the
defendant has committed a crime rather than
being planted prior to its commission. 8s But such
178 Warner, Governmental Deception in Consent Searches, 34
U. MIAMI L. REv. 57, 92-93 (1979). Apart from the
fourth amendment problems touched on here, the police
deception cases raise a number of first, fifth, and sixth
amendment issues, as well as such nonconstitutional mat-
ters as entrapment and trespass. For treatment of these
problems, see generally id.; Dix, Undercover Investigations and
Police Rulemaking, 53 Ttx. L. REv. 203 (1975).
'79 See sources cited in Warner, supra note 178, at 58-
59 nn.5-6.
180See Warner, supra note 178, at 97-98. One advan-
tage of such a compromise is to "free innocent persons
from intrusions into their privacy, for the deceptive as-
sertion of an interest in participating in illegal activity is
unlikely to result in continued association with a person
bent upon only law-abiding activity." 2 W. LAFAVE, supra
note 1, at 682.
'81 [Tihere are critical differences between the cases
in which the actual employee or maid or meterman
chooses to cooperate as a police agent and those in
which he or she is from the beginning a plant. In
the first place, the planting procedure will produce
in gross a larger number of intrusions and increase
the sense of general vulnerability to such exposure.
Second, to validate domestic espionage would rad-
ically change the sort of relationship a person may
have with those with whom he deals in the ordinary
course of living. Instead of asking how likely it is
that this independent person, this ordinary secretary
or maid or meterman, may be persuaded to act for
the police, he must ask how likely it is that this
apparent secretary or meterman or maid is really
an official in disguise. This requires him to make a
judgment about others wholly different from any
we normally think of ourselves as having to make,
for one must not only assess the likelihood that such-
and-such a person will prove loyal, but the like-
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compromises are not possible if consent, whenever
given, removes the situation from the fourth
amendment's scope.
TOWARDS A REGULATORY CONSENT THEORY
The tendency to treat consent searches as inher-
ently reasonable results from bringing only the
atomistic view to such situations. Perhaps, from the
perspective of the consenter, voluntary consent in-
variably negates privacy expectations although
Hoffa and the other unidentified intruder cases
strggest the contrary. 182
lihood that the person with whom one is dealing is
a skilled professional dissembler, able to manufac-
ture the usual indicia of reliability. This would
uproot one's confidence to estimate risks, judge
character, and protect by good social judgment
one's privacy even while working in a cooperative
or communal way. And this sense of sudden uncer-
tainty is introduced into the lives not only of those
engaged in crime but those in whose activities the
police may be thought to have any interest, includ-
ing political and social organizations. One way to
define what would be protected here is to call it an
interest in the ordinariness of social life. Finally,
there is another important distinction between the
two classes of cases, based on the interests of the
reporter. In the case where a person has decided to
help the police rather than the suspicious person
with whom the prior relations exist, both we as the
public and he as a person have a strong interest in
having his freedom of choice protected, just as we
do with that of thejoint occupant. The third person
added to the drama has claims and interests that
arise independently of the struggle between the
defendant and the officer. In the 'plant' case those
interests disappear. We have only the officer, whose
interest is in investigating crime in an official way,
and he has no independent interest in a freedom to
choose how to exercise a power that has come upon
him in the course of his ordinary experience.
White, The Fourth Amendment as a Way of Talking About
People: A Study of Robinson and Matlock, 1974 Sup. CT. REv.
165, 229-30.
182 To argue that the unidentified intruder situations
evidence merely "misplaced confidence" and not privacy
intrusions seriously perverts the concept of privacy. See
note 50 supra. Apparently, under the Hoffa Court's view,
the individual has two choices: keep silent or speak at the
risk of telling the world. This view fails to realize that
"consent to reveal information to a particular person or
agency, for a particular purpose, is not consent for that
information to be circulated to all or used for other
purposes." A. WESTIN, supra note 50, at 375. "The Court
[in Hoffa] thus did not appear to recognize that one's
expectations about what government is doing may legit-
imately differ from one's expectations about what asso-
ciates are or will be doing as private citizens." Grano,
Perplexing Questions About Three Basic Fourth Amendment
Issues: Fourth Amendment Activity, Probable Cause and the
Warrant Requirement, 69 J. CuM. L. & C. 425, 433 (1978).
But, as shown by the Krook-Kopp hypotheticals,
the atomistic view inadequately illuminates con-
sent situations where the police have no reason to
believe consent, in fact given, exists, or where con-
sent is given because of police deception. Such
cases evidence fourth amendment unreasonable-
ness if the regulatory perspective is brought to bear.
After all, it is one thing to say that one relinquishes
his right to be free from warrantless searches by
consenting to a search, but quite another to say he
also relinquishes his right to be free from unreason-
able searches within the scope of his consent. The
right to be free from unreasonable governmental
actions may well be viewed as an absolute, inalien-
able interest and thus incapable of being relin-
quished183 The remainder of this article will sug-
gest an approach which accommodates atomistic
and regulatory views within existing consent the-
ory.
REDEFINING CONSENT
One way to permit the regulatory perspective to
operate in situations of arguably improper intru-
sions occurring within the scope of voluntary con-
sent would be to modify the definition of valid
consent to include considerations of the reasona-
bleness of police conduct as well as the degree of
coerciveness experienced by the consenter. Such an
approach is presently reflected in the apparent
authority doctrine which finds police reasonable-
ness to be a sufficient basis for consent where it is
not actually existing. By the same token, those
courts which invalidate consents induced by decep-
tion are redefining consent by carving out excep-
tions to the general voluntary consent rule. Similar
redefinition could exempt from the category of
consents cases involving uncommunicated and un-
apparent consent where police lack reason to be-
lieve actual consents exist.
But adopting the redefinition approach presents
problems. First, such redefinitions may be incon-
sistent with Supreme Court decisions. If the ab-
sence of coercion is the essence of valid consent, as
Schneckloth says repeatedly, it is difficult to avoid
the conclusion that consents deceptively induced
'8 In his Schneckloth dissent, Justice Marshall makes a
similar point in conjunction with his discussion of the
right to be free from coerced confessions: "Because of the
nature of the right to be free of compulsion, it would be
pointless to ask whether a defendant knew of it before he
made a statement; no sane person would knowingly
relinquish a right to be free of compulsion." 412 U.S. at
281 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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or unperceived by the searcher are, nevertheless,
consents. While police entries into homes by im-
personating encyclopedia salesmen may be inap-
propriate or even unfair, they hardly seem coer-
cive.8'4 Although a single oblique reference in
Schneckloth refers to the interest in maintaining
fairness in consent situations, the Court did not
indicate that it intends to upset earlier cases like
Hoffa which recognize no constitutional unfairness
in deceptively obtaining consent.' 85 Nevertheless,
Schneckloth leaves open the possibility of analyzing
the fairness as well as the coerciveness of consent
searches. If fairness is interpreted broadly to entail
the appropriateness, in terms of fourth amendment
interests and values, of the actions of the police as
well as the injustice to the particular consenter,
adequate accommodations, on a case-by-case basis,
of atomistic and regulatory interests are possible.as
CONSENTS AS "SEARCHES"
A second approach to the problem of unreason-
able consent searches would leave unaltered the
definition of consent but would expand the defi-
nition of searches and seizures from its present
narrow focus on actual and reasonable privacy
expectations to include normative assessments of
the reasonableness of police behavior. Thus if
searches are defined in terms of the desirability of
permitting a given police intrusion to go unhin-
dered, cases of police misconduct may be regulated
even though voluntary consent has been given.
Cases where the consenter unambiguously com-
municates his consent to a known governmental
agent would continue to be conceptualized as in-
herently reasonable non-searches since neither
atomistic nor regulatory considerations require
fourth amendment scrutiny. But all other consent
cases could be thought of as searches and seizures
because the desirability of permitting the unreason-
able police conduct in those cases to go unregulated
is questionable. Under this view, voluntary con-
sent, like reasonable suspicion that a person is
'8' See Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Mi-
randa: What is 'Interrogation'? When Does it Matter?, 67 CEo.
L. J. 1, 5-6, 48-51 (1978). Coercion results only if the
suspect is aware that he is talking with, and being talked
to by, the police.
USee, e.g., the post-Hoffa case, White v. United States,
401 U.S. 745 (1971), discussed in text accompanying
notes 43-47 supra.
"8 Professor LaFave suggests expanding the definition
of consent to include unfairness as the means of resolving
the problem of consents induced by police deception. 2
W. LAFAvE, supra note 1, at 689.
armed and dangerous in the hypothetical above,
provides primafacie evidence of a reasonable intru-
sion which might nevertheless be negated by a
second-order assessment of the reasonableness of
the search. These second-order assessments, as with
the redefinition of consent approach, would permit
a case-by-case analysis of unreasonable consent
situations with exclusion of the evidentiary fruits
of such searches where appropriate.
Again, as with the redefinition of consent ap-
proach, liberalizing the definition of searches and
seizures poses problems in light of existing doctrine.
For one thing, it seemingly calls into question the
standing requirement. If the consenter has actually
permitted the intrusion, it is difficult to see him as
a victim even though the police act unreasonably
from a regulatory perspective. But on the other
hand, if standing issues are to be merged with
issues of whether or not searches and seizures occur,
as Rakas suggests, defendants are searched, and
thus have standing, when police engage in unde-
sirable conduct notwithstanding the defendant's
relinquishment of privacy expectations through his
consent. In addition to considerations of standing,
the expanded definition of searches and seizures in
terms of the desirability of the police conduct as
well as the privacy interests of the defendant may
be difficult to implement in light of the judicial
reluctance to move beyond narrow definitions
based solely on factual privacy expectations.
Hence, both the redefinition of consent and the
consents as searches approaches require some
stretching of existing doctrine to accommodate
regulatory concerns. But without, such stretching,
cases of unreasonable consent sear'ches such as those
identified in this article, will, unfortunately, remain
immune to fourth amendment scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
This article has examined, and found wanting,
the view that voluntary consent to an intrusion by
governmental agents invariably renders the situa-
tion reasonable for fourth amendment purposes.
Some intrusions, particularly those where consent
is uncommunicated, unapparent, or the product of
police deception, raise serious fourth amendment
difficulties which should not be left beyond its pale
simply because the intrusions occur within the
scope of voluntary consent. These situations can be
subjected to fourth amendment scrutiny by either
expanding the definition of voluntary consent to
include factors other than the coerciveness of the
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consent or by expanding the definition of searches
and seizures to include considerations of the desir-
ability of the particular police conduct in addition
to inquiries into actual privacy expectations of the
consenter. Either of these approaches will inject
much needed regulatory perspectives into a scope
doctrine presently captivated by narrow atomistic
concerns.
To a large extent, the problem of reconciling the
regulatory and atomistic views in conseit searches
is symptomatic of the problem which has plagued
the development of a sound body of fourth amend-
ment doctrine in general. Defining the scope of the
fourth amendment is the most difficult and impor-
tant problem in its jurisprudence.187 Much of the
difficulty can be attributed to an inability to ac-
commodate within a system which does not unduly
shackle society's interest in law enforcement, the
atomistic interest in vindicating actual violations
of privacy with such regulatory concerns as pre-
venting their future violation and insisting that
government be principled in its law enforcement
actions. Although this article will not solve these
problems for fourth amendment jurisprudence in
general, it is hoped that their solution will be
advanced in the area of consent searches.
187 See Amsterdam, supra note 3, at 377; Yackle, supra
note 8, at 355.
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